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Abstract
It is argued that while quantum mechanics contains nonlocal or entangled states, the instantaneous
or nonlocal influences sometimes thought to be present due to violations of Bell inequalities in fact arise
from mistaken attempts to apply classical concepts and introduce probabilities in a manner inconsistent
with the Hilbert space structure of standard quantum mechanics. Instead, Einstein locality is a valid
quantum principle: objective properties of individual quantum systems do not change when something
is done to another noninteracting system. There is no reason to suspect any conflict between quantum
theory and special relativity.
1 Introduction
The opinion is widespread that quantum mechanics is nonlocal in the sense that it implies the existence
of long-range influences which act instantaneously over long distances, in apparent contradiction to special
relativity. There is a large and ever growing literature on this topic, so it is not practical to give more than a
few representative citations. See [1–15] for some of the material advocating or defending nonlocality, and [16]
for a helpful survey. There are certainly a substantial number of dissenting voices, among them [17–24], but
one is left with the impression that the proponents of nonlocality are much more confident of their position
than are their opponents—see, for example, the recent exchange between Blaylock [25] and Maudlin [26], or a
recent popular account claiming that quantum nonlocality poses a serious problem for special relativity [27].
It is even claimed, p. 18 of [12], that such influences are so well established that not only are they a part of
current quantum theory, but will necessarily be part of any future theory that makes the same predictions
about certain experimental outcomes. While most of the discussion has taken place among philosophers and
physicists interested in the foundations of quantum mechanics, one does not have to look very far in the
physics research literature or textbooks to find numerous claims that this or that experimental confirmation
of quantum predictions demonstrates the possibility of “interaction free measurement,” or the absence of
“local realism” in the quantum domain, or some similar idea tied to quantum nonlocality. See [28–35] for a
small but not atypical selection.
The widespread belief in the existence of such nonlocal effects seems a bit surprising in view of theorems
[36, 37], whose validity does not seem to be in doubt, to the effect that these (supposed) quantum nonlocal
influences cannot be used to transmit signals or information. Thus they are not detectable by any ordinary
experimental test. Normally (one would think) this would immediately result in their being discarded into
the dustbin of metaphysics. That this has not happened could reflect the unpalatable nature of proposed
alternatives that maintain locality, such as the idea that at the atomic level physics no longer deals with or
describes reality. It seems almost inevitable that if quantum mechanics is incompatible with “local realism”
(a term which in many minds is essentially synonymous with Bell inequalities) but is still somehow local,
then it is realism that must be discarded, and one finds serious arguments to this effect [38]. But if the world
of atoms is unreal, what shall we say of the macroscopic objects which most physicists think are composed
of such atoms? Are the things we see around us (not to mention we ourselves) unreal?
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A serious problem with discussions of nonlocality, whether by advocates or opponents, is that the argu-
ments have not, up till now, been rooted in a clear, unambiguous, and paradox-free formulation of quantum
theory. This deficiency was pointed out in one of his last papers [39] by none other than John Bell himself.
He was aware that such a formulation was not to be found in the textbook treatments at the time he wrote,
and the situation has, unfortunately, not improved since then. What students are taught in courses in
quantum mechanics are techniques for calculation, not the fundamental principles of the subject. The idea
that a wave function collapses when a measurement is carried out, to take a particularly pertinent example,
might represent something physical, in which case measurement processes are good candidates for producing
nonlocal influences, but it might also be nothing but a technique for carrying out a calculation, something
like a change in gauge, with no reason at all to associate it with anything physical, much less superluminal.
Conclusions based upon shaky or incomplete or inconsistent formulations of quantum mechanics inherit,
unfortunately, these same uncertainties.
The purpose of the present paper is to move beyond previous discussions by employing a fully consistent
quantum mechanical approach, aspects of which are summarized below, to study the quantum (non)locality
problem in a consistent way that leads to quite definite conclusions. We will argue, first, that there are quite
precise ways in which quantum mechanics can properly be said to be nonlocal, in a manner which has no
exact classical counterpart. Whether in view of this one should call quantum theory itself “nonlocal” is a
different question. Second, we will argue that the supposed nonlocal influences do not exist, so the conflict
with special relativity is completely imaginary. Third, we will establish on the basis of quantum principles
a strong statement of quantum locality: the objective properties of an isolated individual (quantum) system
do not change when something is done to another non-interacting system.
As serious conceptual scientific issues are seldom resolved by a straightforward analysis of arguments for
or against a particular thesis [40], we are not so naive as to believe that the material presented here will
immediately result in unanimous consent with our conclusions. We do, however, hope to raise the level of
discussion. For too long the topic has been debated in terms of “measurement” and “free will” and other
concepts which, as Bell put it [39], should play no role in a fundamental theory, and which at the very least
make difficult the sort of precise analysis appropriate to physics as a mature, exact science. We claim it is
possible to do much better, and if the reader is capable of doing better yet, so much the better.
Our starting point for addressing the issue of nonlocality is the belief that quantum mechanics is at present
our best fundamental theory of the mechanical laws of nature and applies universally to systems of all sizes,
microscopic or macroscopic, from quarks to quasars, and under all conditions, whether it be an atomic
nucleus, a quantum optics experiment, or the center of the sun. In some circumstances classical mechanics
is an excellent approximation to a more fundamental quantum description, which is always available in
principle, even though it may be very awkward to construct it in detail. In other circumstances classical
mechanics is inadequate and one must have resort to a proper quantum description. Whenever classical and
quantum mechanics are significantly different it is the quantum description that best describes the world as
it is, and in this sense physical reality is quantum mechanical. The fact that the hydrogen atom cannot be
described by the laws of classical physics does not make it any less real; what this tells us is that real reality is
not classical reality. The attitude expressed in [41], that we should be willing to revise our familiar concepts
of reality to fit the teachings of quantum mechanics, has much to recommend it, and is the approach taken
in this paper.
Although quantum and classical mechanics use many of the same words, such as “energy” and “momen-
tum” and “position”, the concepts are not exactly the same. Thus when discussing “location” or “locality”
of things in the real (quantum) world, one needs to employ well-defined quantum concepts that make sense
in terms of the quantum Hilbert space, and not simply import ideas from classical physics with vague ref-
erences to some “uncertainty principle.” Special relativity would have made little progress had Einstein
restricted himself to using “time” in precisely the same way it is employed in pre-relativistic physics, and in
the quantum domain one must be willing to allow quantum mechanics itself to suggest a suitable concept
of locality, along with whatever limitations are needed to make it agree with the mathematical structure of
the theory. Much of the confusion that attends discussions of quantum (non)locality arises from an attempt
to use classical concepts in a quantum context where they do not fit, leading to internal inconsistencies.
The present discussion is also based on the assumption that quantum mechanics is fundamentally stochas-
tic or probabilistic, and this stochasticity is the way the world is, not something limited to the special times or
places at which measurements occur. Consequently, quantum laws, expecially those referring to dynamical
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processes, must be formulated in consistent probabilistic terms. At present the only known way to do this
within the framework of Hilbert space quantum mechanics (without additional classical variables), with prob-
abilities calculated from Schro¨dinger’s unitary time development (without additional artificial “collapses”
added to the dynamics) is to use the (consistent or decoherent) histories formulation [42–50], which will be
employed throughout this paper. The histories approach is not based upon the concept of measurement, and
for this reason does not suffer from the infamous “measurement problem” of quantum foundations [51–53].
Instead, it allows one to analyze measurements using exactly the same formulation of quantum mechanics
that applies to all other physical processes. This analysis shows that when discussed in an appropriate way,
measurement outcomes for properly constructed pieces of apparatus reveal properties possessed by measured
systems before the measurement took place,1 contrary to various claims found in textbooks. Most of what
follows can be understood without referring to the most technically demanding part of the histories approach,
the consistency conditions, though these are used in the latter part of Sec. 5 and in the proof in Sec. 6. In
addition to the detailed discussion of histories quantum mechanics in [49], the reader unfamiliar with the
this approach will find shorter introductions in [54–56].
Our argument aims to clear up the confusion surrounding quantum (non)locality and put future discus-
sions of this subject on a firm footing. It involves several steps. The first is to discuss the sense in which
quantum mechanics allows nonlocal or entangled states, and the precise way in which these can be said
to be nonlocal. This genuine nonlocality, the topic of Sec. 2, needs to be clearly understood and clearly
distinguished from the notion of a nonlocal influence of the sort mentioned above. The two have sometimes
been confused, but they are in fact very different.
Following this comes a discussion in Sec. 3 of the Bohm version [57] of the famous Einstein, Podolsky
and Rosen (EPR) situation [58], starting with a macroscopic version involving colored slips of paper, to
which no one would ascribe any nonlocal influences, and going on to argue that very much the same analysis
applies in the case of measurements on an entangled spin singlet pair. To be sure, spin measurements allow
for additional possibilities that are not practical for slips of paper, and the issue is how to interpret them
and what conclusions can be drawn. One can come to paradoxical conclusions by ignoring the principles of
quantum mechanics, but the issue is fundamentally a local one; it is not nonlocal.
The majority of discussions of quantum nonlocality involve Bell inequalities [1, 3, 59] in some way or
another. All are agreed that quantum mechanics predicts large violations of the Bell-CHSH inequality, and
by now most physicists concede that experimental tests support the quantum predictions. There remains
a significant difference of opinion as to what conclusions one should draw from this. On one side are those
who claim that because locality is one of the assumptions that goes into the derivation of the inequality,
its violation proves that the quantum world is nonlocal. Not just in the genuine sense discussed in Sec. 2,
but that there exist nonlocal influences. On the other side are those (including the present author) who
believe that other assumptions contradict quantum principles, leading to an inequality that is incompatible
with the quantum nature of the world. In the present paper we consider the Bell-CHSH inequality from
two slightly different perspectives. First, in Sec. 4 we derive it by a method which, while not exact from a
quantum perspective can nevertheless be justified as a good enough approximation for all practical purposes
in the case of golf balls. One can then see how the derivation breaks down because of noncommutation of
operators in the domain where quantum effects can no longer be ignored. The noncommutation has to do
with local operators.
Second, in Sec. 5 we take up the factorization and independence conditions on probabilities involving
a hidden variable (or variables), denoted by λ in most treatments of the subject, which are often used
in deriving the inequality, and ask how they apply to a very simple microscopic system represented by a
quantum circuit involving four elements (all qubits in the simplest case). We insist that the probabilities
be well defined and the hidden variables be represented by quantum mechanical projectors, so as to make
the discussion relevant to the real (quantum) world. Using the circuit model one can ask about the possible
existence of quantum hidden variables, properly defined quantum properties associated with subspaces of
the Hilbert space, which can play the role of λ. It turns out that sometimes they exist and sometimes they
do not exist, and this has very much to do with local incompatibility issues, i.e., (non)commuting operators,
and nothing at all to do with mysterious nonlocal influences. Our conclusion is that this route to deriving
Bell inequalities is not based on local realism, as is often claimed, but instead on an assumption of classical
1Measurements are discussed in considerable detail in Chs. 17 and 18 of [49]; the reader may also find helpful various toy
models of measurements in earlier chapters. For a more condensed discussion see [54].
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realism. This renders the Bell-CHSH inequality invalid for drawing conclusions about the real (quantum)
world, in particular its locality or lack thereof.
Following these arguments we go on in Sec. 6 to establish the positive result that objective properties
of isolated individual systems do not change when something is done to some other non-interacting system.
Thus not only does the claim for nonlocal influences in the quantum domain rest upon shaky arguments
lacking a fundamental justification, it is also in flat contradiction to a result based on consistent quantum
arguments. Claims, such as in [9,27], that supposed nonlocal influences make quantum mechanics a threat to
special relativity (or the reverse) are, consequently, without foundation. Various implications of our results
are discussed in the concluding Sec. 7.
In an article of modest length it is impossible to deal with all published arguments claiming that quantum
theory is beset with nonlocal influences and in conflict with special relativity. In particular we do not discuss
those based upon the GHZ [60, 61] or Hardy [62] paradoxes, nor Stapp’s counterfactual arguments.2 Both
Hardy’s paradox and the problems associated with importing counterfactual reasoning into the quantum
domain are treated in some detail in Chs. 25 and 19, respectively, of [49], from a point of view similar to
that in this paper, and the conclusion regarding nonlocal influences is the same: there is no evidence for
them. Also see [64] with reference to special relativity and quantum probabilities.
2 Genuine Nonlocality
Many errors contain a grain of truth, and this is true of the mysterious nonlocal quantum influences. Quan-
tum mechanics does deal with states which are nonlocal in a way that lacks any precise classical counterpart.
Understanding the nature of this genuine nonlocality will help in identifying the misunderstandings which
have given rise to the notion of spurious influences, so it is worth beginning with this topic. One does not
need an entangled state, for the lack of this kind of locality is already present in a wavepacket ψ(x) for
a single particle in one dimension. Imagine ψ(x) spread out over an interval x1 ≤ x ≤ x2; a continuous
function that is nonzero at any point inside this interval and zero for all x outside this interval. The physical
interpretation of ψ(x) depends on more than |ψ(x)|2, for two wavepackets ψ(x) and φ(x) may be such that
|ψ(x)|2 = |φ(x)|2, and yet be orthogonal to each other, which means that they represent distinct quantum
properties. Thus the physical meaning of ψ(x) depends on relative phases or phase differences at different
points in space. The same is true in relativistic quantum mechanics where the phase differences are at
spacelike separate points. Similarly, entangled states of two spin-half ions in a trap, or two photons traveling
away from a crystal where they were produced by down conversion, can properly be said to be nonlocal.
But in what sense are they nonlocal? Let us discuss this for ψ(x). Since it vanishes outside the interval
[x1, x2] it is localized to (or on) this interval, but inside the interval itself it is delocalized in the following
precise sense. Let [ψ] = |ψ〉〈ψ| be the projector onto the subspace of the Hilbert space of square integrable
functions that contains ψ(x), and X(x′, x′′) the projector onto the interval [x′, x′′],
X(x′, x′′)φ(x) =
{
φ(x) for x′ ≤ x ≤ x′′
0 elsewhere.
(1)
Since by assumption ψ(x) is nonzero throughout the interval from x1 to x2, the projectors [ψ] and X(x
′, x′′)
will fail to commute when x′ or x′′ is in the interior of [x1, x2], i.e., if x1 < x
′ < x2 or if x1 < x
′′ < x2. That
is to say, the property3 of being “local,” located within the interval [x′, x′′], is incompatible in the quantum
sense of noncommuting projectors with the property of being “in the state ψ” if the interval [x′, x′′] is
chosen injudiciously. Informally, the particle cannot be localized more precisely than the support of its wave
function. Because the issue is one of noncommutation of operators, or incompatibility of the corresponding
physical properties, we are dealing with a feature of the quantum world which lacks any precise analog
in, and which cannot be reduced to, classical physics. The essential point is not that a measurement of
2See [63] and references to earlier work found there. Stapp agrees (private communication) that his arguments typically
involve counterfactual elements.
3As used in this article the term “property” as applied to a quantum system always corresponds to some (closed) subspace
of the Hilbert space or, equivalently, the projector onto this subspace, and is to be distinguished from a “physical variable”
represented by a Hermitian (self-adjoint) operator. Thus the eigenspace of the Hamiltonian H corresponding to a particular
eigenvalue ǫ represents the property H = ǫ. See the discussion in Chs. 4 and 5 of [49].
4
position will not yield a predictable result. While this is true, it is also true in the case of a classical particle
described in classical statistical mechanics with a probability distribution. What is new in the quantum
case is noncommutation. This needs to be recognized as such, not dismissed with a vague reference to an
uncertainty principle.
This sort of nonlocality is typical of entangled states when the entanglement involves objects or situations
which are spatially separated from each other, as in the case of the spin singlet state
|ψ0〉 =
(
|+〉A|−〉B − |−〉A|+〉B
)
/
√
2, (2)
of two spin-half, spatially separated particles, where we assume that |+〉 corresponds to Sx = +1/2 in units
of h¯, and |−〉 to Sx = −1/2, and the subscript indicates which particle. (This is the well-known example
Bohm [57] used to elucidate the EPR problem.) One cannot ascribe a property to the spin of particle A, such
as SAx = +1/2, if the combined system has the property of being in the state |ψ0〉. The relevant projectors
do not commute, so the local property is incompatible with the property represented by the entangled state.
In this quite precise quantum mechanical sense the state (2) can be said to be nonlocal when the two particles
are in different locations as specified by the spatial parts of the total wave function.
Nonlocality in this sense is just one manifestation of the quite general situation that arises when properties
are defined using projectors on the quantum Hilbert space instead of subsets of points in the classical phase
space, and different properties may correspond to projectors that do not commute, the hallmark of quantum
in contrast to classical physics. Properties which are incompatible do not have a conjunction that makes
physical sense. If P1 and P2 are two commuting projectors, then P1P2 = P2P1 is a projector representing
the property “P1 AND P2.” But if P1P2 6= P2P1, neither product is a projector, and there is no natural way
(consistent with ordinary logic) of defining a corresponding “P1 AND P2” property. See the discussion in
Ch. 4 of [49].
Quantum incompatibility manifests itself in various ways which are not directly connected with local
properties. For example, it is incorrect to ascribe a property to the spin of the electron in a hydrogen atom
in its ground state, of which (2) is the spin part, even though the electron and proton are not spatially
separated but lie on top of each other (to the extent possible in the quantum world). Nontrivial unitary
time dependence is described by states which are “nonenergetic” in the sense that the projector onto such a
state at some given time fails to commute with the Hamiltonian, which is to say with the projectors making
up its spectral decomposition. Similarly, wavepackets of finite extent are “nonmomentous” as well as being
“nonlocal” in the sense described above.
Genuine quantum nonlocality thus refers to descriptions of quantum systems in terms of their local
properties, or perhaps the incompatibility of such properties with the specified quantum state. By contrast,
the notion of nonlocal influences, also called spooky action at a distance, superluminal influences, etc., refers
to a (supposed) dynamical effect: what is done to a certain quantum system here can have an instantaneous
influence on a second system located far away, be it at the other end of the laboratory or (in principle) the
other side of the galaxy. Nonlocal properties, which are very much part of the quantum world, do not by
themselves imply the presence or absence of nonlocal influences. However, as we shall see, various claims
that quantum theory contains nonlocal influences can reflect a failure to take adequate account of certain
local manifestations of quantum incompatibility.
3 Correlations Not Causes
Charlie in Chicago takes two slips of paper, one red and one green, places them in two opaque envelopes,
and after shuffling them so that he himself does not know which is which, addresses one to Alice in Atlanta
and the other to Bob in Boston, both of whom know the protocol Charlie is following. Upon receipt of
the envelope addressed to her Alice opens it and sees a red slip of paper. From this she can immediately
conclude that the slip in Bob’s envelope is green, whether or not Bob has already opened his envelope, or
will ever do so. Her conclusion is not based on a belief that opening her envelope to “measure” the color
of the slip of paper has some magical long-range influence on the color of Bob’s slip. Instead it employs
statistical reasoning in the following way.
Before Alice opens the envelope she (or Bob or Charlie) can assign probabilities to the various situations
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as follows:
Pr(A = R,B = R) = Pr(A = G,B = G) = 0,
Pr(A = R,B = G) = Pr(A = G,B = R) = 1/2, (3)
where A = R means a red slip in Alice’s envelope, B = G a green slip in Bob’s, etc., and Pr() refers to the
joint probability distribution. From the usual rule for conditional probabilities, Pr(C |D) = Pr(C,D)/Pr(D)
it follows that
Pr(B = R |A = R) = 0, Pr(B = G |A = R) = 1, (4)
and this is the conditional probability distribution that Alice uses to infer the color of Bob’s slip knowing
that the one in her envelope is red. One could say that she uses the outcome of her observation to “collapse”
the initial probability distribution (3) onto the conditional probability distribution (4). The colors of the two
slips of paper, the ontological situation in the physical world, is not at all affected by Alice’s “measurement.”
It is her knowledge of the world that changes, in a way which we do not find at all surprising. The “collapse,”
if that is what one wishes to call it, refers to a method of reasoning, not a physical effect.
Next consider a situation in which Charlie at the center of the laboratory pushes a button, and one
member of a pair of spin-half particles initially in the entangled state (2) is sent towards Alice’s apparatus
at one end of the building, while the other is simultaneously sent towards Bob’s apparatus at the other end.
If Alice measures the x component of spin of her particle and the apparatus indicates A = 1 corresponding
to Sx = 1/2 before the measurement took place—let us assume that Alice is a competent experimentalist
who has designed and built a piece of apparatus which can do a measurement of this sort4—what can she
say about Sx for Bob’s particle? The chain of probabilistic inference is identical to that discussed earlier for
colored slips of paper, though, as we shall see, certain details must be discussed with greater care.
In order to use probabilities in quantum theory in a consistent way it is necessary to specify, as in every
application of probability theory, a sample space5 of mutually exclusive possibilities: one and only one of
which occurs in any particular experimental run. Two incompatible properties of a quantum system cannot
both be included in the same sample space since they are not mutually exclusive. This makes choosing a
sample space for spin half particles more subtle than the corresponding problem for slips of paper, even though
in principle the two problems (viewed from a quantum perspective) are similar. The other novelty for spin
half is that there are various different incompatible sample spaces one may wish to consider, whereas for slips
of paper there is in practice no need to consider alternatives to the usual quasiclassical framework: [44,45,50]
and Sec. 26.6 of [49].
Note, incidentally, that choosing the sample space is part of setting up a stochastic or probabilistic
theoretical model of the situation, and the reality being modeled is no more influenced by the physicist’s
choice of a sample space than would the flow of traffic on the Pennsylvania Turnpike be influenced by
someone in the Department of Transportation setting up a stochastic model thereof. Using one sample space
rather than another will determine what properties the physicist is able to discuss, but it does not influence
these properties. A helpful but limited analogy—no classical picture can accurately portray all aspects of
the quantum world—is that of a photographer choosing to photograph a mountain from the north rather
than from the south. Different perspectives yield different possibilities for obtaining information.6
Quantum sample spaces are always (projective) decompositions of the identity I on the quantum Hilbert
space, and for the problem under discussion it is useful to use the following four projectors
[+]A ⊗ [+]B, [+]A ⊗ [−]B, [−]A ⊗ [+]B, [−]A ⊗ [−]B, (5)
where [+] = |+〉〈+|, [−] = |−〉〈−|, and the subscripts are particle labels. The projector [+]A ⊗ [−]B
corresponds to SAx = +1/2, and SBx = −1/2. The four projectors are mutually orthogonal, so represent
mutually exclusive events, and add up to the identity IA ⊗ IB on the spin space of the two particles, thus
4In talks given by experimental particle physicists one hears all sorts of references to trajectories and spins of elementary
particles before they are measured. That this talk is perfectly justified from the perspective of quantum mechanics has been
known for a long time; see Sec. 2 of [42], and for more details Chs. 17 and 18 of [49]. Competent experimentalists ignore
the nonsense they were taught in their introductory quantum mechanics courses about measurements producing results out of
nowhere. The quantum foundations community should do the same.
5See, for example, p. 4 of [65] or p. 6 of [66].
6The reader may find it helpful to look at various examples in Ch. 18 of [49] in order to see how different sample spaces can
be used in the context of quantum measurements.
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covering all possibilities. We are interested in the corresponding probabilities at a time t1 when the particles
are close to but before they reach the measuring apparatuses, the counterpart of a time before the envelopes
are opened in the case of slips of paper.
The probabilities associated with the events in (5) can be calculated in the following way. Assume Charlie
has constructed an apparatus which will reliably produce the spin state |ψ0〉 in (2) at some time t0 < t1,
and that the quantum unitary time development operator T (t1, t0) from time t0 to t1 for the spin degrees of
freedom is the identity, so
|ψ1〉 = T (t1, t0)|ψ0〉 = |ψ0〉. (6)
One may then use the Born rule
Pr(Q) = 〈ψ1|Q|ψ1〉 (7)
to assign a probability to any of the properties Q in (5) at the time t1, with the result
Pr(SAx = +
1
2 , SBx = +
1
2 ) = Pr(SAx = − 12 , SBx = − 12 ) = 0,
Pr(SAx = +
1
2 , SBx = − 12 ) = Pr(SAx = − 12 , SBx = + 12 ) = 1/2. (8)
The probabilities in (8) are the analogs of those in (3), and by using them Alice can apply exactly the
same form of statistical reasoning as in the case of slips of paper. If her observation (apparatus) indicates
that the particle arriving at her end of the laboratory had Sx = +1/2 just before the measurement took
place, as reflected in the measurement outcome, she can infer that the particle arriving at Bob’s end of the
laboratory had Sx = −1/2 just before his measurement took place. Thus the mode of statistical reasoning is
identical for spins and slips of paper once an appropriate sample space has been adopted and the probabilities
calculated by the rules of quantum dynamics for the system under consideration. At this point a number of
comments are in order.
1. Why discuss spins of particles at a time before any measurements took place? Because measurements
of this type can have violent effects on the properties measured. In a Stern-Gerlach apparatus, for example,
there is no reason to suppose that the spin of the particle after the measurement, when the particle may
have been destroyed or stuck to a glass plate, is the same as before. In the case of measurements which
preserve a property, so that it is the same after the measurement as before, one can of course also consider
the spin state after the measurement, but in general this is not possible.
2. Why suppose that the macroscopic outcome of Alice’s reflected a property which the particle had before
the measurement took place? It is possible in principle to analyze the action of the apparatus in fully quantum
mechanical terms, and show that for an appropriately constructed apparatus, having properties which should
be satisfied if it is constructed by a competent experimentalist, the Sx values before the measurement and
the pointer position after the measurement are appropriately correlated: the latter indicates the former. See
Chs. 17 and 18 of [49]. Of course this is not the sort of argument which will convince every sceptic, but it is
the sort of reasoning which physicists apply to experimental results all the time. The issue is analogous to
what one meets in astronomy: why does the image on the CCD accurately reflect the light coming in from
the sky? One needs to understand how the apparatus works.
3. Could not Alice have measured Sz instead of Sx, by using a modified apparatus? Yes, and in
that case the measurement outcome using the appropriately constructed apparatus would have provided no
information about the value of Sx, and she would be able to say nothing at all about Sx for Bob’s particle.
But couldn’t she have used the outcome to say something about Sz for Bob’s particle? Yes, but to do so
would have meant employing a sample space different from, and incompatible with, that in (5). Alice has a
choice in determining what it is she measures, and this choice determines what she can say on the basis of the
measurement outcome about properties of Bob’s particle. Later, Sec. 5.2, we will construct a toy model of
what it means for an experimentalist to make a choice, and analyzing this model can aid understanding. But
in no case does Alice’s choice of which measurement to do have any influence whatsoever on any property
of Bob’s particle: this will be demonstrated in Sec. 6.
4. An important conceptual point relates to the role of |ψ1〉 as defined by unitary time development
in (6) and used in (7). When employing the sample space (5) at the time t1, |ψ1〉 cannot be considered a
physical property of the particle system at this time, because [ψ1] does not commute with the projectors
in (5). Instead it enters (7) as a calculational tool, a device for computing probabilities, a pre-probability
in the terminology introduced in Sec. 9.4 of [49]. Failing to distinguish a ket as a calculational device from
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a ket as a physical property (to be precise, the property corresponds to the ray containing this ket, or the
projector onto this ray) is a source of considerable conceptual confusion.
5. Cannot the same probabilities be calculated by collapsing a wave function? They can, and wave
function collapse should be considered a calculational device, a means of computing probabilities, often
conditional probabilities, that can be obtained equally well by other methods with less spectacular names.
The careless use of “collapse” ideas has led to all sorts of conceptual difficulties and paradoxes which can
be avoided if one is careful about setting up sample spaces and calculating quantum probabilities according
to well-defined fundamental principles. On the other hand, collapse can be a very useful computational
tool. Suppose that Alice has measured Sx = +1/2 for her particle. She can then use |ψ1〉 to compute a
“conditional” ket |−〉B =
√
2〈+|A|ψ1〉, in a somewhat awkward use of Dirac notation, for the spin state
of Bob’s particle, thought of as a pre-probability. This conditional ket provides a fast way to calculate
probabilities of outcomes of Bob’s measurements if they are made in some basis other than the [±]B of (5).
An equally good approach, though it takes a trifle longer, is to carry out the “collapse” by taking the partial
trace over A of the operator ([+]A ⊗ IB)[ψ1]. The point is that “collapse” is one way of carrying out a
calculation involving a stochastic model, following the standard rules of probability theory, and has nothing
to do with any mysterious influence from one end of the laboratory to the other.
6. Both in the case of slips of paper and in the case of spin half, Alice can, quite properly, assign a
different probabilistic description to the world after she knows the outcome of her observations than she
can before. This difference could be manifested in assigning a different wave function (as in the previous
paragraph) or a different density operator, or in various other ways. Since quantum mechanics has long
been regarded, at least in practice, as a stochastic theory, this should not come as a surprise. Unfortunately,
conditional probabilities are not properly treated in quantum textbooks. Wave function collapse is used
for this purpose, but it is then confused with a physical effect rather than being properly identified as a
calculational tool.
7. Suppose Alice has her apparatus set up to measure Sx and obtains some value, which she, as a compe-
tent experimentalist, believes to be the value possessed by this component of the spin angular momentum of
the particle before the measurement took place. But she could instead have measured Sz, and in that case
she would have reached the conclusion that Sz had a particular value. Thus not only did Sx have the value
actually measured, but it must also have had some value of Sz, the value that would have been measured in
the counterfactual world in which the apparatus was set up to measure Sz. Is this not paradoxical?
The reader familiar with the original EPR paper [58] will immediately recognize in this the sort of
argument by which they concluded that quantum mechanics is incomplete, except that now it is entirely a
“local” matter having to do with just one particle. The weak point in such reasoning is its counterfactual
character; see the discussion of quantum counterfactuals in Sec. 19.4 of [49] for an analysis of what can go
wrong. The problem is always some violation of the single framework rule, some mixing of arguments from
incompatible sample spaces. Thus an argument, as in the preceding paragraph, which starts off with Sx
and ends up discussing Sz for the same particle at the same instant of time cannot be embedded in a single
sample space, and is thus an attempt to apply reasoning appropriate to classical physics in a context in
which it doesn’t work.
To summarize this section before going on to additional topics. The correlations of the Bohm-EPR sort
are similar to and can be understood using probabilistic reasoning of the same sort involved in the analogous
situation involving colored slips of paper, where no one would ever suggest the existence of nonlocal influences.
The analysis in both cases has to be carried out using a properly defined sample space. For slips of paper
viewed quantum mechanically there is only a single quasiclassical sample space that needs to be taken into
account in practice. Although the quantum physicist can very well imagine other possibilities (e.g., with slips
of different colors in some macroscopic or Schro¨dinger-cat superposition) they are of no practical interest.
By contrast, alternative incompatible sample spaces are relevant to possible laboratory experiments on spin
half particles (or correlated photons), so choosing the sample space—a choice made by the physicist, not
by some “law of nature”—is not automatic, and care must be exercised not to mix conclusions based on
incompatible sample spaces.
8
4 Golf Balls
Consider two spinning golf balls A and B, and let LAa and LBb denote the a and b components of their spin
angular momentum (e.g., a might be x or z). Further let
Aa = sgn(LAa), Bb = sgn(LBb) (9)
be the algebraic signs, ±1 or 0 of these components. In a probabilistic setting in which LAa and LBb are
random variables one can define a correlation function
C(a, b) = 〈AaBb〉, (10)
where 〈·〉 denotes the average taken with respect to the joint probability distribution. The Bell-CHSH
inequality [1, 3, 59]
|C(a, b) + C(a, b′) + C(a′, b)− C(a′, b′)| ≤ 2, (11)
where a and a′ are denote two (in general different) components of the spin of particle A, and b and b′ are
similarly defined, is a consequence of the following straightforward argument.
Define the random variable
W = AaBb +AaBb′ +Aa′Bb −Aa′Bb′ (12)
From (10) and the linearity of 〈·〉 one sees that the left side of (11) is |〈W 〉|. Since W depends on each of
the four quantities Aa, Aa′ , Bb, and Bb′ in a linear manner it follows that if each of these is confined to the
range [−1,+1], the maximum and minimum of W must occur when each is +1 or −1, and then by looking
at the various possibilities one sees that W itself is confined to the interval
− 2 ≤W ≤ 2. (13)
Since the average of a quantity that always lies between −2 and +2 falls in the same range, we have
demonstrated the correctness of (11). Thus (11) follows at once from the definitions in (9) and (10) through
a straightforward application of standard probability theory. It has nothing to do with how the golf balls
were set spinning in the first place, or how the components were measured (if they were measured), and
nothing to do with locality or location. To be sure, it is hard to imagine two golf balls on top of each other
at the same location, but it is easy to imagine that A and B are the same golf ball at a single location but
at two different times, in which case (11) will again be valid.
This derivation was carried out using classical physics. Let us see what happens when we try and
“quantize” it by replacing LAa and LBb with the corresponding quantum operators JAa and JBb (in units
of h¯), with commutation relations
[JAx, JAy] = iJAz, [JBx, JBy] = iJBz, [JAx, JBy] = 0, (14)
and so forth. Replace (9) with
Aˆa = PA+1 − PA−1, Bˆb = QB+1 −QB−1. (15)
where PA+1 is a projector onto the subspace of the Hilbert space spanned by eigenvectors of JAa with
positive eigenvalues, PA−1 onto those with negative eigenvalues, and the Q’s are similarly defined using JBb.
Let Wˆ be the operator obtained by putting hats on the symbols on the right side of (12). It is Hermitian,
since the Aˆ’s commute with the Bˆ’s, and therefore if its eigenvalues fall within the interval (13) the quantum
average 〈W 〉 will fall within the same range, and we again arrive at (11).
Alas, (13) no longer holds if W is replaced by Wˆ . What is wrong with the derivation immediately
preceding (13) in the quantum case, i.e., if we put hats on the A and B symbols? This is seen most easily by
considering the extreme case where A and B are spin-half particles. Suppose that a = z and a′ = x, so that
Aˆa and Aˆa′ become the noncommuting Pauli operators σz and σx, and also let b = z and b
′ = x. One sees
that the spectra of the individual operators lies in the range [−1, 1], the same as with the classical random
variables assumed previously. However, because the operators no longer commute the “subtraction” trick
by which the last term in (12) in effect “cancels” one of the preceding terms no longer suffices to restrict
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the spectrum of Wˆ to the range (13). To summarize, while classical reasoning can often be applied in the
quantum domain and still yield correct results, there are occasions in which it fails and one has to employ
the correct quantum tools.
Note that the failure has to do with noncommuting operators : were it the case that AˆaAˆa′ = Aˆa′Aˆa the
argument leading up to (13) would still be correct, though one would want to reword it in the language
of operators rather than classical random variables. Thus we have to do with an argument which is valid
in the classical domain, but whose quantum counterpart breaks down. Note that this the breakdown has
no connection with anything nonlocal. The Aˆ operators commute with the Bˆ operators, but not among
themselves. To be sure, in order to violate (11) we have to consider a situation in which Aˆa fails to commute
with Aˆa′ and Bˆb fails to commute with Bˆb′ . But this is no sign of nonlocality; it merely shows that physicists
sometimes get away with careless arguments.
Despite the foregoing remarks one can still justify the application of (11) to golf balls through the
following chain of reasoning. Let us take the commutation relation (14) and divide it by the total angular
momentum quantum number J so that it becomes
[LAx, LAy] = iLAz/J (16)
in terms of “normalized” dimensionless operators LAx = JAx/J , etc., which are then of order 1 in a typical
situation. As J for a spinning golf ball is of the order of 1030, we see that noncommutativity is in practice
not likely to be of much concern. Thus while the derivation of (11) is, strictly speaking, wrong even for
golf balls, it is at least plausible that there are circumstances in which we are justified in saying that it
holds as an excellent classical approximation, valid for all practical purposes when discussing macroscopic
objects, or even spinning molecules if they are not too small. And as with all classical approximations, we
are not surprised if (11) breaks down in a situation where those approximations are no longer valid. To be
sure, showing that classical physics emerges in an appropriate limit from quantum physics is not altogether
straightforward, and the approximate commutation exhibited in (16) when J is large is only the beginning
of the process. To do it properly requires the introduction of an appropriate coarse-graining using quasi-
classical frameworks—see the brief remarks in Sec. 26.6 of [49], and see [45] for more details. Some care
is needed, for even when J is very large it is possible to exhibit Bell-like inequalities violated by quantum
mechanics [67, 68]. That, however, only adds further strength to the case being made here: inequalities of
this sort belong to the domain of classical, not quantum physics
There is actually another serious defect with the attempt to derive (11) in the quantum case along the
lines suggested above, by placing hats on the operators that appear in (12). The difficulty is that (12) is
then a sum of noncommuting Hermitian operators. While it is formally true that the sum of the averages is
equal to the average of the sums, this hides a conceptual difficulty: what is the average that one is talking
about? Students of quantum theory learn that placing a Hermitian operator inside angular brackets brings
good marks on the examination, but there is empirical evidence [69] that they do not understand what they
are doing. (We may count it fortunate that no similar research has been carried out on their instructors!)
A proper use of probability theory requires that a sample space be specified, and while in quantum theory
this is often implicitly taken to be defined by the eigenspaces of the Hermitian operator in question, that is
obviously problematic when taking the sum of noncommuting operators which may have no eigenspaces in
common. Sometimes an effort is made to evade this problem by claiming that the only probabilities being
referred to are the outcomes of measurements. But then one must pay serious attention to how measurement
outcomes are related to measured quantities, as in the discussion in the following section.
In summary, the Bell-CHSH inequality is one of many results in classical statistical physics which do not
always hold in the real (quantum) world. It can be derived from quantum principles provided one makes
approximations which in many situations will be valid for all practical purposes in the case of macroscopic
objects. Nothing in the classical or quantum derivations gives the least suggestion of any nonlocal influences.
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5 Hidden Variables
5.1 Factorization and independence
Bell’s inequality can be derived provided the probabilities for a certain set of random variables satisfy two
equations. The first is often called “locality” but we will refer to as the factorization condition:
Pr(A,B | a, b, λ) = Pr(A | a, λ) Pr(B | b, λ). (17)
The second is the independence condition
Pr(λ | a, b) = Pr(λ). (18)
In a formal sense we are dealing with five random variables A,B, a, b, λ, and the probabilities in these
equations are marginal probabilities obtained from a “master” distribution Pr(A,B, a, b, λ). Summing over
some variables yields the marginal distribution, e.g. Pr(A,B, a) =
∑
b,λ Pr(A,B, a, b, λ), for those which
remain, and conditional probabilities are defined as usual.
In the present application A and B are to be thought of as macroscopic measurement outcomes, taking
values between −1 and +1, on two separated but perhaps correlated systems A and B, while a and b refer to
the types of measurements carried out; e.g., settings of knobs that determine which properties of A and B are
measured in order to yield the outcomes A and B. The interpretation of the hidden variable (or variables,
but it is quite adequate to use a single discrete variable) λ is much less clear, and that is the essential topic
to be discussed. One usually thinks of it as some sort of microscopic state associated with the systems to be
measured before the measurement takes place. Hopefully its significance will become clearer in the following
discussion. Its only role in the derivation of Bell’s inequality (11) is that it exists in such a way that (17)
and (18) are satisfied.
The first step in obtaining (11) is to combine (17) and (18) to yield
Pr(A,B | a, b) =
∑
λ
Pr(A | a, λ) Pr(B | b, λ) Pr(λ), (19)
which we leave to the reader as an exercise in probability theory; note that it is not a consequence of (17)
alone, but also requires (18). Next—compare with (10)—define
C(a, b) =
∑
A,B
AB Pr(A,B | a, b) =
∑
A,B
AB Pr(A | a, λ) Pr(B | b, λ) Pr(λ) =
∑
λ
Aa(λ)Bb(λ) Pr(λ) (20)
where
Aa(λ) :=
∑
A
APr(A | a, λ), Bb(λ) :=
∑
B
B Pr(B | b, λ), (21)
are quantities lying in the interval [−1, 1], given that both A and B are in this range. Consequently, using
the same argument that leads to (13), we conclude that
W (λ) = Aa(λ)Bb(λ) +Aa(λ)Bb′(λ) +Aa′(λ)Bb(λ) −Aa′(λ)Bb′ (λ) (22)
lies in the interval [−2, 2]. Thus multiplying (22) by Pr(λ) and summing over λ leads to the Bell-CHSH
inequality (11).
Since, as noted earlier, (11) does not hold in general in the quantum world, it follows that there are
circumstances in which either (17) or (18) or both fail, which is to say one can find no quantum hidden
variable λ such that both conditions are satisfied. Before going further it is worth remarking why one might
expect both of these to hold in circumstances in which classical physics gives an excellent approximation to
quantum mechanics. Imagine that the golf balls of Sec. 4 have been shot out in opposite directions from
a machine that has first set them spinning in opposite senses about some randomly chosen axis. Next,
measurements of different components of angular momentum are carried out by competent experimentalists,
so the outcomes A and B reflect properties of the golf balls just before the measurements took place. One
would expect these measurement outcomes to show correlations: Pr(A,B | a, b) as determined experimentally
would not be equal Pr(A | a) Pr(B | b). But if λ is the hidden variable (~LA, ~LB) corresponding to the actual
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angular momenta of each of the golf balls just before measurements take place, one would expect (17) to
hold—each of the terms is either 0 or 1—for a properly constructed apparatus. And (18) is the plausible
assumption that ~LA and ~LB are functions of the initial preparation of the golf balls and the air resistance
they have encountered on their way to the measurement apparatus, but are not influenced by the settings of
apparatus knobs, which could have been selected by a random number generator at the very last moment.
5.2 Quantum circuit
What goes wrong with (17) or (18) in the quantum world? Rather than attempt an abstract discussion it
is helpful to set up a specific model, shown in Fig. 1 as a quantum circuit in which time increases from left
to right.7 The four horizontal lines represent D-state quantum systems or qudits, but all the essential ideas
are present for the D = 2 qubit case, think of spin-half particles. They undergo interactions shown by boxes
connected to vertical lines. The total Hilbert space
H = Ha ⊗HA ⊗HB ⊗Hb (23)
is the tensor product of those for the individual particles. Different times tj in the order t0 < t1 < t2 < t3
are indicated in the figure by dashed vertical lines.
V
U
t0 t1 t2 t3
b
B
A
a
b
B
A
a
|φb〉
|φa〉

|Φ〉(a)
V
U
t0 t1 t2 t3
b
B
A
a
b
B
A
a
|φb〉
|φa〉

|Φ〉(b)
Figure 1: Quantum circuit with (a) all measurements after t3; (b) measurements on ancillaries before t2
determine the later measurement types.
In Fig. 1(a) a and b are ancillary systems used to generate different types of measurements, and kets in
the corresponding orthonormal (standard or computational) bases are denoted by |a〉 and |b〉, with a and b
taking on the values 1, 2, . . .. (Note that (quantum) computer scientists prefer to start the count at 0 rather
than 1, a matter of indifference for the present discussion.) The square boxes U and V connected to vertical
lines represent the gates, or unitary operations,
U =
∑
a
|a〉〈a| ⊗ U (a), V =
∑
b
|b〉〈b| ⊗ V (b) (24)
7Such circuits are widely used in quantum information theory; see, e.g., Ch. 4 of [70] or Chs. 1 and 2 of [71],
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carried out on Ha ⊗HA and Hb ⊗HB, respectively. Hence the total unitary time development from time t2
to t3 corresponds to the operator
T (t3, t2) = U ⊗ V , (25)
while T (t′, t) on any other time interval is determined by the usual composition rule
T (tl, tj) = T (tl, tk)T (tk, tj) (26)
and the fact that T (t1, t0) and T (t2, t1) are simply the identity I on H.
The D symbols in Fig. 1 denote measurements and the dashed lines at later times in (b) denote the
“classical” measurement outcomes. In a fully quantum description the measurement apparatus must itself
be described in quantum terms; see, for example, Chs. 17 and 18 of [49]. Including the apparatus Hilbert
space(s) produces no problem in principle, but doing so adds nothing (except technical complications) to
the following discussion. We shall simply assume, as in most quantum information discussions, that the
measurements are ideal: there is a one-to-one correspondence between the pointer positions, represented
schematically by dashed lines, and the prior values of the measured qubits (or qudits). Thus |a = 1〉 at t3
in Fig. 1(a) or t1 in (b) leads to a measurement outcome or pointer position which can also be denoted by
a = 1, and likewise for the b qubit. In the case of A and B we adopt a slightly different convention in which
the qubit kets are labeled by ±1, thus kets |A = 1〉 and |A = −1〉 will lead to measurement outcomes A = 1
and A = −1, since this is what we have been using when discussing Bell’s inequality.
Figure 1(b) differs from (a) in that the measurements on the ancillary systems a and b have been carried
out at an earlier time, just after t1, and the classical or macroscopic outcomes are used to determine which
unitary operation to apply to A or B. It is well known8 that the circuits (a) and (b) yield exactly the same
measurement statistics, the same joint probability distribution Pr(A,B, a, b). For the present discussion the
advantage of (b) is that it provides a quantum model for a situation in which the type of measurement, that
is, the a and b value, is determined at the very last instant t2 before the measurement takes place through
what is in effect flipping a quantum coin. By choosing the state |φa〉 to be a superposition of the |a〉 states,
the value of a at t2, which determines which type of measurement will be carried out on A, is decided at
the very last instant; similarly for the B side. As we shall see, this guarantees that (18) is satisfied for the
hidden variables of interest to us, allowing us to focus on (17).
But in what sense does the value of a determine the type of measurement? Applying a unitary transfor-
mation U (a) to the particle A and then measuring it at time t3 in the standard basis is completely equivalent
to measuring it at time t2 in a different basis consisting of the states obtained by applying U
(a)† to the
standard basis |A = ±1〉. This principle is by now well accepted in the quantum information community,
and the reader not familiar with it is invited to check it by working out some examples.
Assuming an initial state at time t0 of the form,
|Ψ0〉 = |Φ〉 ⊗ |φa〉 ⊗ |φb〉 (27)
and using the circuit in Fig. 1(a), we can calculate the joint probability distribution of interest at time t3 by
using the Born rule,
Pr(A,B, a, b) = 〈Ψ3|
(
[a]⊗ [A]⊗ [B]⊗ [b]
)
|Ψ3〉, (28)
where square brackets indicate projectors, [a] = |a〉〈a|, etc., and
|Ψ3〉 = T (t3, t0)|Ψ0〉 = (U ⊗ V)|Ψ0〉. (29)
One can also write
Pr(A,B, a, b) = 〈Ψ2|
(
[a]⊗ P (a)A ⊗Q(b)B ⊗ [b]
)
|Ψ2〉 (30)
where |Ψ2〉 = T (t2, t0)|Ψ0〉, and
P
(a)
A = U
(a)†[A]U (a), Q
(b)
B = V
(b)†[B]V (b) (31)
8See [72] and the ”Principle of deferred measurement” on p. 186 of [70].
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are projectors obtain by mapping [A] and [B] backwards in time from t3 to t2, so they correspond to the
measurement bases “chosen” by the quantum coin flips. Since there are no gates between t0 and t2 in
Fig. 1(a), one can replace |Ψ2〉 in (30) with |Ψ0〉, and simplify the resulting expression to give
Pr(A,B, a, b) = Pr(a) Pr(b)〈Φ|P (a)A ⊗Q(b)B |Φ〉, (32)
where Pr(a) = 〈φa|[a]|φa〉 and Pr(b) = 〈φb|[b]|φb〉.
Note that for a fixed a {P (a)A } is a decomposition of the A identity,
IA =
∑
A
P
(a)
A . (33)
Analogous comments apply to the Q
(b)
B . Using (33) and its analog for B one can sum both sides of (32)
over A and B to obtain Pr(a, b) = Pr(a) Pr(b), i.e, these variables are statistically independent, an obvious
consequence of our choice of a product initial state |φa〉 ⊗ |φb〉 in (27). This means that the choice of
measurement on the A side is not only random, but also uncorrelated with the choice of measurement on
the B side.
5.3 Quantum hidden variables
Following this somewhat lengthy introduction to the circuit in Fig. 1 let us now use it to search for genuine
quantum properties which might be counterparts of, or at least resemble in some way, the mysterious λ
that plays a central role in discussions of Bell’s inequality in the literature. In particular it is interesting
to look for some counterpart of λ at a time t1 preceding that at which the quantum coins, Fig. 1(b), are
flipped to “choose” what types of measurements will be carried out on A and B. Further let us assume that
the quantum counterpart of λ is some property or properties of the A and B particles at this time, as this
makes for a relatively simple (though by no means trivial) discussion, rather than allowing it to also refer
to properties of the ancillary systems or measuring apparatuses.9
Given that we need a fully quantum mechanical description of the situation and that the properties of
interest are associated with three successive times: t0 < t1 < t2, a quantum histories approach is necessary,
as this is the only known way to carry out a consistent probabilistic discussion in such a situation within the
framework of standard quantum mechanics. There is, of course, no sense in which λ can be “measured” in
order to produce probabilities in the usual textbook approach, since we are assuming that the measurement
apparatuses do not interact with the systems of interest until later. In the notation introduced in Ch. 8
of [49] the simplest quantum sample space of histories associated with Fig. 1(a) will be of the type
[Ψ0]⊙ {Λλ} ⊙ {[a]⊗ P (a)A ⊗Q(b)B ⊗ [b]}. (34)
Thus an initial state [Ψ0] at t0 is followed at t1 by one of the properties represented by a projector Λλ, where
the collection {Λλ} for different λ, hereafter denoted by Λ, constitutes a decomposition of the identity IAB ,
and at t2 we allow the properties corresponding to A,B, a, b as in (30). (One could also use the circuit in
Fig. 1(b); the essential results are the same but the analysis becomes more complicated because the [a] and
[b] events must be replaced with measurement outcomes.)
The rule for assigning probabilities to such a family of histories can be written in terms of an interference
or decoherence functional [45]
J (A,B, a, b, λ, λ′) := 〈Ψ0|Λλ
(
[a]⊗ P (a)A ⊗Q(b)B ⊗ [b]
)
Λλ′ |Ψ0〉 = δλ,λ′ Pr(A,B, a, b, λ), (35)
which is to be interpreted as follows. The first equality defines what is, in effect, a collection of m × m
matrices with indices λ and λ′ in the case in which the decomposition {Λλ} contains m elements. For each
possible value of A, B, a, and b there is such a matrix. The second equality is the requirement that each
of these matrices be diagonal: all off diagonal elements, λ 6= λ′, must vanish, in order for the interference
9Bell in his analysis in [3] introduces another random variable c, that plays no role in the probabilistic analysis, as it is a
condition in every probability. One could use it to denote the apparatus and coin states at time t1 in our analysis, without
changing any conclusion.
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functional to define a probability. Provided this consistency (or decoherence) condition is satisfied, each
diagonal element defines a probability in the master distribution Pr(A,B, a, b, λ), from which all the others,
in particular those that occur in (17) and (18), can be calculated.
It is important to notice that, just as in classical statistical physics, there is not a unique choice of sample
space, and thus no unique choice for the projectors in Λ = {Λλ}. The question of interest is therefore
whether there exists some Λ such that the consistency conditions are satisfied (as otherwise probabilities are
not defined), and such that the factorization and independence conditions, (17) and (18), are also satisfied.
This requires a consideration of various possibilities, some of which are taken up in Sec. 5.4 below.
Since we are assuming, as discussed above, that the hidden variables refer to the AB subsystem, it is
convenient to introduce the states
|Φλ〉 = Λλ|Φ〉 (36)
on HA ⊗HB and rewrite (35) in the simpler form
Pr(a) Pr(b)〈Φλ|P (a)A Q(b)B |Φλ′〉 = δλ,λ′ Pr(A,B, a, b, λ). (37)
If consistency is satisfied, summing both sides over A and B, and using using (33) and its counterpart for
B, lead to the result
Pr(a, b, λ) = Pr(a) Pr(b) Pr(λ), (38)
where Pr(λ) = 〈Φλ|Φλ〉. This means that the independence condition (18) is satisfied. Thus we need only
consider the factorization condition (17), which can be written as
〈P (a)A Q(b)B 〉λ = 〈P (a)A 〉λ〈Q(b)B 〉λ, (39)
where for any operator R on HA ⊗HB
〈R〉λ := 〈Φλ|R|Φλ〉/〈Φλ|Φλ〉. (40)
To summarize up to this point. We are looking for quantum hidden variables, a decomposition {Λλ} of the
identity on HA ⊗HB which can be part of a consistent family of histories, that is to say
〈Φλ|P (a)A Q(b)B |Φλ′〉 = 0, for λ 6= λ′ (41)
and in addition (39) holds for all values of A,B, a, b and λ.
5.4 Examples
A full exploration and characterization of quantum hidden variables, understood as decompositions {Λλ}
of IAB for which the consistency conditions of families such as (34) are satisfied, and hence can be part
of a consistent quantum description of the joint probability distribution of these particles as a function of
time, is outside the scope of the present paper. Sometimes quantum hidden variables exist satisfying the
factorization and independence conditions (17) and (18), and sometimes they do not exist; it depends on
the initial state |Φ〉 of the AB system and the types of measurements which are carried out, as determined
by the U (a) and V (b) operators. We shall only consider a small number of possibilities, but from these one
gets a fairly good idea of what the issues are.
1. The choice
Λ = {[Φ], I − [Φ]}, (42)
that is, a projector onto the initial state |Φ〉 together with its negation, is implicit in von Neumann’s discussion
of measurement [73], see Sec. 18.2 of [49], and hence in much subsequent work. It leads to |Φ1〉 = |Φ〉 and
|Φ2〉 = 0 in (36). Consequently the consistency conditions (37) are always satisfied. But factorization, a
single equation (39) with λ = 1, will typically not be satisfied. In such cases we can conclude that (42) is not
a quantum random variable satisfying the factorization condition. We cannot thereby conclude that there
are no quantum hidden variables satisfying factorization and independence, but only that if there are, they
are not of the form (42). The reason for this cautionary note appears in the next example.
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2. Suppose that for all a and all A the projectors in the collection {P (a)A } commute with each other.
They can then be simultaneously diagonalized using a single orthonormal basis {|αj〉}, and one can choose
as hidden variables the projectors
Λj = [αj ]⊗ IB (43)
onto these basis states. The consistency conditions are satisfied and the states |Φλ〉 of (36) are product
states,
|Φj〉 = |αj〉 ⊗ |χj〉, (44)
so the factorization condition is satisfied: (39) holds for every λ = j. Thus under these circumstances
appropriate quantum hidden variables exist, and Bell’s inequality will be satisfied. Note that had we used
(42) instead of (43) the factorization condition would (in general) not hold. Thus when one choice of
quantum hidden variable fails to satisfy the conditions of factorization and independence this does not, by
itself, exclude the possibility that some other choice might work better.
The “mirror image” of this example, when all projectors in the collection {Q(b)B } commute with each
other, is worth mentioning in that one will need a different set of quantum hidden variables, {IA ⊗ [βj ]}
for an appropriate orthonormal basis {|βj〉} of HB, to establish a factorization condition. It is typical of
quantum theory that sample spaces have to be chosen differently in different circumstances, in contrast to
classical physics where one can always in principle employ a common refinement of the sample spaces of
interest, and thus reduce everything to a single sample space.
3. There are, as is well known, instances in which Bell’s inequality is violated. One of the simplest is
when a, b, A, B are all two-level systems or qubits, |Φ〉 is the singlet state (2), the P (a)A for a = 1 and 2
project onto the Sx and Sz bases of A, and similarly Q(b)B for b = 1 and 2 project onto the Sx and Sz bases of
B. The violation of Bell’s inequality in this case proves there exists no (consistent) choice of hidden variables
Λ for the family (34) which will satisfy the factorization condition.
The contrast between examples 2 and 3 is particularly instructive in analyzing why a derivation of the
Bell-CHSH inequality is sometimes possible and sometimes fails in the quantum context. The key to example
2 is that all the projectors in the collection {P (a)A } commute with each other. It is frequently the case that
when operators for physical quantities or properties that are of interest commute, or at least almost commute
with each other, one can successfully get away with classical reasoning applied to a quantum problem, as in
the case of the golf balls in Sec. 4. On the other hand, classical reasoning tends to break down in situations in
which noncommutivity is too large to be ignored. The commutativity of interest in the present circumstance
has to do with local operators referring to properties of A (or B in the mirror image of example 2), not
nonlocal operators such as the [Φ] that projects on an entangled state. Therefore these examples lend no
support to the idea that quantum mechanics implies mysterious nonlocal effects or influences. Instead, it is
quantum incompatibility, whether local or nonlocal, that is the central issue.
In summary, the factorization and independence conditions (17) and (18) whose conjunction leads to
the Bell-CHSH inequality can be studied from a quantum perspective provided one can find appropriate
quantum properties associated with the hidden variable λ, properties which must satisfy the consistency
conditions in order to have well defined probabilities. Sometimes hidden variables exist for which (17) and
(18) are satisfied, and sometimes they do not exist. But their nonexistence is no indication of the existence
of long range influences. Instead, it is one more example of the fact that the quantum world does not obey
the laws of classical physics.
6 Genuine Locality
Let us define Einstein Locality in the following way10
Objective properties of isolated individual systems do not change when something is done to
another non-interacting system
10The wording is essentially the same as in Sec. 2 of [74], where Mermin refers to it as “generalized Einstein locality.” For
Einstein’s own statement see p. 85 of [75]: “But on one supposition we should, in my opinion, absolutely hold fast: the real
factual situation of the system S2 is independent of what is done with the system S1, which is spatially separated from the
former.”
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Before presenting the argument that this is a valid quantum principle let us again consider the example
of red and green slips of paper in Sec. 3. Alice’s opening her envelope, looking at the slip of paper to see what
color it is, and then dropping it into her files or into the fireplace has absolutely no effect on the properties
of the slip of paper in Bob’s envelope, including its color. It is her knowledge of what is in Bob’s envelope,
not the objective properties of that slip of paper, that changes. Spacelike separation in the relativistic sense
is not required; it is only necessary that the one envelope or its contents not interact with the other. One
could, for example, imagine a very sophisticated arrangement in which one envelope is equipped with a radio
transmitter and the other a receiver coupled to a device which releases a dye that changes the color of the
slip of paper. Placing the two envelopes at a sufficient spacelike separation from each other during the time
interval of interest would, of course, prevent that sort of signaling. but relativity is not the real issue.
Quantum theory describes properties of a system using (projectors on) subspaces of the appropriate
Hilbert space, and as noted in Sec. 2, incompatible subspaces cannot be combined to yield meaningful
properties. Hence a meaningful quantum discussion of objective properties of an isolated system requires
the use of a framework containing those properties (or their projectors), and this will necessarily exclude other
incompatible frameworks from the discussion. The very concept of Einstein locality requires frameworks in
which those properties of the isolated system we are concerned about have some meaning, as otherwise it is
obviously impossible to discuss whether they do or do not change.
A quantum system A can be said to be isolated from another system B provided the overall time
development operator for the two systems is of the form TA(t
′, t) ⊗ TB(t′, t) during the time interval of
interest. Deciding whether an objective property of A will change when something is done to B is best
discussed using a third system C that “does” the something, which is to say it interacts with B but not with
A. Thus we assume an overall dynamics of the tripartite system of the form
T (t′, t) = TA(t
′, t)⊗ TBC(t′, t). (45)
And in order to study the effects of what C does to B we assume an initial state of the form
|Ψ0〉 = |Φ〉AB ⊗ |φ〉C (46)
at t0, and ask whether properties of A are altered by using different initial states |φ〉 for C.
Consider a particular sequence of properties A
(αj)
j of A at a succession of times tj during which it
is isolated, so (45) applies. The joint probability distribution can be calculated using the interference or
decoherence functional [45]—see also see Sec. 10.2 of [49] and compare with (35)—
J (α1, α2 . . . , α′1, α′2 . . .) = 〈Ψ0|K(α)†K(α′)|Ψ0〉 = TrA[ρAK(α)†K(α′)] (47)
where α stands for α1, α2, . . ., the chain operator K(α) is defined by
K(α) := A(αn)n T (tn, tn−1)A
(αn−1)
n−1 · · ·A(α1)1 T (t1, t0), (48)
and
ρA := TrBC(|Ψ0〉〈Ψ0|) = TrB(|Φ〉〈Φ|) (49)
is the reduced density operator of A at t0. If the interference functional J (α, α′) vanishes whenever αj 6=
α′j for some j, which is to say the consistency conditions are satisfied, its diagonal elements provide the
probabilities of the corresponding histories of the A system. The point is that neither consistency nor the
resulting probabilities depend in any way on the choice of the initial state |φC〉 for system C, because ρA, (49),
is independent of |φC〉. This completes the argument that whatever is done to the system B has absolutely
no effect upon any of the properties, or a time sequence of such properties, of the non-interacting system
A. The reader who prefers to see how things work out in a particular instance, rather than relying on the
general proof given here, will find an example in Sec. 23.4 in [49].
7 Conclusion
The basic conclusions of this paper can be summarized as follows. Although quantum theory involves the
use of nonlocal states, such as wave packets and entangled states, there is nothing in the theory, or in the real
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world so far as it is accurately described by quantum theory, that corresponds to the sorts of instantaneous
nonlocal influences which have often been thought to arise in the situation envisaged in the EPR paradox, or
implied by the fact that quantum theory violates Bell inequalities. When quantum mechanics is consistently
applied using properly formulated probabilities on properly defined sample spaces the complete absence of
such nonlocal influences can be shown in two ways.
First, derivations of Bell inequalities, while valid for all practical purposes in a macroscopic situation
in which the appropriate quantum projectors commute, fail when the classical approximations to quantum
theory are no longer valid. Therefore it is not surprising that they are violated by quantum theory as applied
to suitable microscopic objects. What this violation tells us is not the locality breaks down, but rather that
classical physics no longer applies in the quantum domain. To be sure, the analysis in this paper only applies
to some particular derivations of these inequalities, but there is no reason to believe that others escape the
fundamental difficulties which we have identified: the unjustified use of classical ideas, in particular the
careless use of probabilities, in the quantum domain.
Second, the same techniques that reveal deficiencies in derivations of Bell inequalities can be used to
demonstrate in a positive sense a principle of Einstein locality which directly contradicts any notion of
nonlocal influences. That such a principle is correct is hardly surprising given that even the most enthusiastic
proponents of nonlocal influences have conceded that these cannot be used to transmit signals or information.
The advance represented by the formulation used in the present paper is that confusing ideas and possible
loopholes associated with an ill-defined concept of “measurement” are absent from the discussion, and no
longer provide a screen behind which such supposed influences can conceal their nonexistence. Nonlocal
influences cannot be used to transmit signals for the simple reason that there are none.
Our results indicate that spurious nonlocal influences arise from mistaken reasoning, from applying
classical modes of analysis in the quantum domain where they do not apply. While the fundamental source
of the problem was pointed out some time ago by Fine [17], the tools for dealing with it decisively using a
fully consistent formulation of quantum probabilities have only been developed more recently. These allow
a much more precise discussion of the problem than was possible in the past.
Whatever difficulties may remain in reconciling quantum mechanics and special relativity have nothing
to do with the spurious nonlocal influences thought to arise because of the mistaken application of Bell
inequalities to the quantum domain. Certain alternatives to standard Hilbert space quantum theory, in
particular the de Broglie Bohm pilot wave approach [76] and the spontaneous localization scheme of Ghirardi,
Rimini and Weber [77], are known to possess a basic incompatibility with special relativity. However,
standard quantum mechanics when give a consistent stochastic interpretation does not suffer from these
problems, contrary to claims in some popular (e.g., [27]) as well as more technical (e.g., [9]) discussions.
(For more details on how probabilities can be consistently introduced into relativistic quantum mechanics
see [64].)
The analysis in this paper implies that claims that quantum theory violates “local realism” are misleading.
To be sure, quantum mechanics allows entangled states which are incompatible with, as discussed in Sec. 2,
certain local properties. That this disagrees with intuitions based upon pre-quantum physics is obvious, but
why refer to the latter as “realistic”? It is the quantum world, not the classical world, which is the real world
according to modern physics. And quantum mechanics is in full accord with the principle of Einstein locality
stated in Sec. 6. Now it is true that a science can survive despite misleading terminology—“heat capacity”
in modern thermodynamics, in which heat is no longer regarded as a fluid, comes to mind as one example.
Nonetheless, there is much to be gained by adopting terms which reflect rather than stand in disagreement
with our best current scientific understanding of a subject. It would be quite appropriate to say that quantum
theory contradicts “classical local realism,” or, better yet, “classical realism.” It is classical realism, not
local realism, that is in serious disagreement with the best experimental results currently available.
One wonders whether the energy expended discussing nonlocality might not be better used for investi-
gating what is genuinely mysterious and surprising about quantum theory in contrast to classical physics:
quantum incompatibility. Whereas entangled states that are incompatible with local properties provide one
manifestation of this, there are many others. The subject is not well understood, either at the mathematical
or the intuitive level, and is nowadays an area of active research in the field of quantum information. Thus
it is incompatibility rather than nonlocal influences that deserves attention by those interested in the foun-
dations of quantum mechanics. We have a situation in which one can honestly say that truth is stranger,
but also a lot more interesting, than fiction.
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